| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25607 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25607 |
| Equilibrium Allocations under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence from Deceased Donor Kidneys | |
| Nikhil Agarwal; Itai Ashlagi; Michael A. Rees; Paulo J. Somaini; Daniel C. Waldinger | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-04 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade-offs in designing these mechanisms depend on agents preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under alternative designs for the deceased donor kidney waitlist. We model the decision to accept an organ or wait for a preferable one as an optimal stopping problem and estimate preferences using administrative data from the New York City area. Our estimates show that while some kidney types are desirable for all patients, there is substantial match-specific heterogeneity in values. We then develop methods to evaluate alternative mechanisms, comparing their effects on patient welfare to an equivalent change in donor supply. Past reforms to the kidney waitlist primarily resulted in redistribution, with similar welfare and organ discard rates to the benchmark first come first served mechanism. These mechanisms and other commonly studied theoretical benchmarks remain far from optimal. We design a mechanism that increases patient welfare by the equivalent of an 18.2 percent increase in donor supply. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25607 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583281 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nikhil Agarwal,Itai Ashlagi,Michael A. Rees,et al. Equilibrium Allocations under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence from Deceased Donor Kidneys. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25607.pdf（713KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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