| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25616 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25616 |
| Optimal Managed Competition Subsidies | |
| Keaton S. Miller; Amil Petrin; Robert Town; Michael Chernew | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-04 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When markets fail to provide socially optimal outcomes, governments often intervene through ‘managed competition’ where firms compete for per-consumer subsidies. We introduce a framework for determining the optimal subsidy schedule that features heterogeneity in consumer preferences and inertia, and firms with heterogeneous costs that can set prices and product characteristics in response to changes in the subsidy. We apply it to the Medicare Advantage program, which offers Medicare recipients private insurance that replaces Traditional Medicare. We calculate counterfactual equilibria as a function of the subsidies by estimating policy functions for product characteristics from the data and solving for Nash equilibria in prices. The consumer-welfare-maximizing budget-neutral schedule increases aggregate annual consumer welfare by $4.6 billion over the current policy and is well-approximated with a linear rule using market-level observables. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25616 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583290 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Keaton S. Miller,Amil Petrin,Robert Town,et al. Optimal Managed Competition Subsidies. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25616.pdf（795KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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