| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25623 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25623 |
| Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from Pakistan | |
| Joel Slemrod; Obeid Ur Rehman; Mazhar Waseem | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-04 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine two Pakistani programs to explore the role of deterrence as well as social and psychological factors in the tax compliance behavior of agents. In the first of these programs, the government began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country. The second program publicly recognizes and rewards the top 100 tax paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals, and wage-earners. We find that both public disclosure and social recognition of top taxpayers caused a substantial increase in tax payments. We explore the drivers of this behavior, including the shift of social norms toward compliance. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25623 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583297 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joel Slemrod,Obeid Ur Rehman,Mazhar Waseem. Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from Pakistan. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25623.pdf（1325KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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