| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25644 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25644 |
| Who\u2019s Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives | |
| Erik P. Gilje; Todd Gormley; Doron Y. Levit | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-11 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers’ incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a manager’s actions benefit the investor’s overall portfolio. Empirically, we show that potential drivers of ownership overlap, including mergers in the asset management industry and the growth of indexing, could in fact diminish managerial motives. Our findings illustrate the importance of accounting for investor inattention and cast doubt on the possibility that the growth of common ownership has had a significant impact on managerial incentives. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25644 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583316 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Erik P. Gilje,Todd Gormley,Doron Y. Levit. Who\u2019s Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25644.pdf（2033KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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