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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25654
来源IDWorking Paper 25654
Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids
Sylvain Chassang; Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Juan M. Ortner
发表日期2019-03-18
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated. There is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: it is inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop a theory of data-driven regulation based on “safe tests,” i.e. tests that are passed with probability one by competitive bidders, but need not be passed by non-competitive ones. We provide a general class of safe tests exploiting weak equilibrium conditions, and show that such tests reduce the set of equilibrium strategies that cartels can use to sustain collusion. We provide an empirical exploration of various safe tests in our data, as well as discuss collusive rationales for missing bids.
主题Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25654
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583328
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Sylvain Chassang,Kei Kawai,Jun Nakabayashi,et al. Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids. 2019.
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