| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25654 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25654 |
| Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids | |
| Sylvain Chassang; Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Juan M. Ortner | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-18 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated. There is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: it is inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop a theory of data-driven regulation based on “safe tests,” i.e. tests that are passed with probability one by competitive bidders, but need not be passed by non-competitive ones. We provide a general class of safe tests exploiting weak equilibrium conditions, and show that such tests reduce the set of equilibrium strategies that cartels can use to sustain collusion. We provide an empirical exploration of various safe tests in our data, as well as discuss collusive rationales for missing bids. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25654 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583328 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvain Chassang,Kei Kawai,Jun Nakabayashi,et al. Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25654.pdf（920KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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