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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25658
来源IDWorking Paper 25658
Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary, Fiscal and Debt Maturity Policy
Eric M. Leeper; Campbell B. Leith; Ding Liu
发表日期2019-03-18
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要The textbook optimal policy response to an increase in government debt is simple—monetary policy should actively target inflation, and fiscal policy should smooth taxes while ensuring debt sustainability. Such policy prescriptions presuppose an ability to commit. Without that ability, the temptation to use inflation surprises to offset monopoly and tax distortions, as well as to reduce the real value of government debt, creates a state-dependent inflationary bias problem. High debt levels and short-term debt exacerbate the inflation bias. But this produces a debt stabilization bias because the policy maker wishes to deviate from the tax smoothing policies typically pursued under commitment, by returning government debt to steady-state. As a result, the response to shocks in New Keynesian models can be radically different, particularly when government debt levels are high.
主题Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25658
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583332
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Eric M. Leeper,Campbell B. Leith,Ding Liu. Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary, Fiscal and Debt Maturity Policy. 2019.
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