| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25658 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25658 |
| Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary, Fiscal and Debt Maturity Policy | |
| Eric M. Leeper; Campbell B. Leith; Ding Liu | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-18 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The textbook optimal policy response to an increase in government debt is simple—monetary policy should actively target inflation, and fiscal policy should smooth taxes while ensuring debt sustainability. Such policy prescriptions presuppose an ability to commit. Without that ability, the temptation to use inflation surprises to offset monopoly and tax distortions, as well as to reduce the real value of government debt, creates a state-dependent inflationary bias problem. High debt levels and short-term debt exacerbate the inflation bias. But this produces a debt stabilization bias because the policy maker wishes to deviate from the tax smoothing policies typically pursued under commitment, by returning government debt to steady-state. As a result, the response to shocks in New Keynesian models can be radically different, particularly when government debt levels are high. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25658 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583332 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric M. Leeper,Campbell B. Leith,Ding Liu. Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary, Fiscal and Debt Maturity Policy. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25658.pdf（1205KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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