| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25660 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25660 |
| Exploitation of Labor? Classical Monopsony Power and Labor's Share | |
| Wyatt J. Brooks; Joseph P. Kaboski; Yao Amber Li; Wei Qian | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-18 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How important is the exercise of classical monopsony power against labor for the level of wages and labor's share? We examine this in the context of China and India – two large, rapidly-growing developing economies. Using theory, we develop a novel screen to quantify how wages are affected by market power exerted in labor markets, either by a single firm or a group of cooperating firms. The theory guides the measurement of labor “markdowns”, i.e., the gap between wage and the value of the marginal product of labor, and the screen examines how they comove with local labor market share and the share of cooperating firms. Applying this test, we find that markdowns substantially lower the labor share: by up to 10 percentage points in China and 15 percentage points in India. This impact has fallen over time in both countries as firm concentration in these labor markets has decreased. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25660 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583334 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wyatt J. Brooks,Joseph P. Kaboski,Yao Amber Li,et al. Exploitation of Labor? Classical Monopsony Power and Labor's Share. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25660.pdf（416KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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