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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w25712 |
来源ID | Working Paper 25712 |
Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing | |
Thomas R. Covert; Richard L. Sweeney | |
发表日期 | 2019-04-01 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allocation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 40 percent larger upfront payments and 60 percent more output than negotiated leases did. These results suggest large potential gains from employing centralized, formal mechanisms in markets that traditionally allocate in an unstructured fashion, including the broader $3 trillion market for privately owned minerals. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Environmental and Resource Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25712 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583386 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas R. Covert,Richard L. Sweeney. Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w25712.pdf(618KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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