| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25716 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25716 |
| How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing? | |
| Christian Dippel; Michael Poyker | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-08 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles shows that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. Using newly collected sentencing data including a number of states not previously studied, we find that elected judges in several states do not appear to change their sentencing when they are up for re-election. This heterogeneity in the presence of electoral sentencing cycles appears to be best explained by cross-state variation in the competitiveness of judicial elections. Incumbent judges do levy harsher sentences when they are in a competitive re-election campaign, but in states where competition for judgeships is low this does not come to the forefront. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25716 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583394 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Dippel,Michael Poyker. How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing?. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25716.pdf（1323KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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