| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25724 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25724 |
| The Democracy Effect: a Weights-Based Identification Strategy | |
| Pedro Dal Bó; Andrew Foster; Kenju Kamei | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-08 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) show experimentally that the effect of a policy may be greater when it is democratically selected than when it is exogenously imposed. In this paper we propose a new and simpler identification strategy to measure this democracy effect. We derive the distribution of the statistic of the democracy effect, and apply the new strategy to the data from Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) and data from a new real-effort experiment in which subjects’ payoffs do not depend on the effort of others. The new identification strategy is based on calculating the average behavior under democracy by weighting the behavior of each type of voter by its prevalence in the whole population (and not conditional on the vote outcome). We show that use of these weights eliminates selection effects under certain conditions. Application of this method to the data in Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) confirms the presence of the democracy effect in that experiment, but no such effect is found for the real-effort experiment. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25724 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583398 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pedro Dal Bó,Andrew Foster,Kenju Kamei. The Democracy Effect: a Weights-Based Identification Strategy. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25724.pdf（262KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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