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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25793
来源IDWorking Paper 25793
The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt
Matthias Schlegl; Christoph Trebesch; Mark L.J. Wright
发表日期2019-05-06
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要Sovereign governments owe debt to many foreign creditors and can choose which creditors to favor when making payments. This paper documents the de facto seniority structure of sovereign debt using new data on defaults (missed payments or arrears) and creditor losses in debt restructuring (haircuts). We overturn conventional wisdom by showing that official bilateral (government-to-government) debt is junior, or at least not senior, to private sovereign debt such as bank loans and bonds. Private creditors are typically paid first and lose less than bilateral official creditors. We confirm that multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank are senior creditors.
主题International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25793
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583466
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GB/T 7714
Matthias Schlegl,Christoph Trebesch,Mark L.J. Wright. The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt. 2019.
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