| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25793 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25793 |
| The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt | |
| Matthias Schlegl; Christoph Trebesch; Mark L.J. Wright | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-06 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Sovereign governments owe debt to many foreign creditors and can choose which creditors to favor when making payments. This paper documents the de facto seniority structure of sovereign debt using new data on defaults (missed payments or arrears) and creditor losses in debt restructuring (haircuts). We overturn conventional wisdom by showing that official bilateral (government-to-government) debt is junior, or at least not senior, to private sovereign debt such as bank loans and bonds. Private creditors are typically paid first and lose less than bilateral official creditors. We confirm that multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank are senior creditors. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25793 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583466 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthias Schlegl,Christoph Trebesch,Mark L.J. Wright. The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25793.pdf（623KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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