| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25794 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25794 |
| Do Distressed Banks Really Gamble for Resurrection? | |
| Itzhak Ben-David; Ajay A. Palvia; René M. Stulz | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-06 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore the actions of financially distressed banks in two distinct periods that include financial crises (1985-1994, 2005-2014) and differ in bank regulations, especially concerning capital requirements and enforcement. In contrast to the widespread belief that distressed banks gamble for resurrection, we document that distressed banks take actions to reduce leverage and risk, such as reducing asset and loan growth, issuing equity, decreasing dividends, and lowering deposit rates. Despite large differences in regulation between periods, the extent of deleveraging is similar, suggesting that economic forces beyond formal regulations incentivize bank managers to deleverage when their banks are in distress. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25794 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583467 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Itzhak Ben-David,Ajay A. Palvia,René M. Stulz. Do Distressed Banks Really Gamble for Resurrection?. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25794.pdf（518KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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