| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25800 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25800 |
| Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception | |
| Judd B. Kessler; Corinne Low; Colin Sullivan | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-06 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Discrimination |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25800 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583473 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Judd B. Kessler,Corinne Low,Colin Sullivan. Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25800.pdf（495KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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