| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25835 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25835 |
| Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies and Electoral Accountability | |
| Stefano Gagliarducci; M. Daniele Paserman; Eleonora Patacchini | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-13 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies how politicians and voters respond to new information on the threats of climate change. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations between 1989 and 2014, we document that congress members from districts hit by a hurricane are more likely to support bills promoting more environmental regulation and control in the year after the disaster. The response to hurricanes does not seem to be driven by logrolling behavior or lobbysts' pressure. The change in legislative agenda is persistent over time, and it is associated with an electoral penalty in the following elections. The response is mainly promoted by representatives in safe districts, those with more experience, and those with strong pro-environment records. Our evidence thus reveals that natural disasters may trigger a permanent change in politicians' beliefs, but only those with a sufficient electoral strength or with strong ideologies are willing to engage in promoting policies with short-run costs and long-run benefits. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25835 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583507 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefano Gagliarducci,M. Daniele Paserman,Eleonora Patacchini. Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies and Electoral Accountability. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25835.pdf（1995KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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