| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25857 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25857 |
| Reputation Inflation | |
| Apostolos Filippas; John J. Horton; Joseph M. Golden | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-20 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A solution to marketplace information asymmetries is to have trading partners publicly rate each other post-transaction. Many have shown that these ratings are effective; we show that their effectiveness deteriorates over time. The problem is that ratings are prone to inflation, with raters feeling pressure to leave “above average” ratings, which in turn pushes the average higher. This pressure stems from raters’ desire to not harm the rated seller. As the potential to harm is what makes ratings effective, reputation systems, as currently designed, sow the seeds of their own irrelevance. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25857 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583530 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Apostolos Filippas,John J. Horton,Joseph M. Golden. Reputation Inflation. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25857.pdf（1381KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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