| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25885 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25885 |
| Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments | |
| Gaurab Aryal; Manudeep Bhuller; Fabian Lange | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-27 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across non-central and central municipalities in Norway to construct hidden and transparent instruments. We estimate a private return of 7.9%, of which 70% is due to increased productivity and the remaining 30% is due to signaling. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25885 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583558 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gaurab Aryal,Manudeep Bhuller,Fabian Lange. Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25885.pdf（933KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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