| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25901 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25901 |
| Factions, Local Accountability, and Long-Term Development: Theory and Evidence | |
| Hanming Fang; Linke Hou; Mingxing Liu; Lixin Colin Xu; Pengfei Zhang | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-03 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theoretical model of how factional affiliation and local accountability can shape the policy choices of local officials who are concerned about political survivals, and subsequently affect the long-term local development. We provide empirical evidence in support of the theoretical predictions using county-level variations in development performance in Fujian Province in China. When the Communist armies took over Fujian Province from the Nationalist control circa 1949, communist cadres from two different army factions were assigned as county leaders. For decades the Fujian Provincial Standing Committee of the Communist Party was dominated by members from one particular faction, which we refer to as the strong faction. Counties also differed in terms of whether a local guerrilla presence had existed prior to the Communist takeover. We argue that county leaders from the strong faction were less likely to pursue policies friendly to local development because their political survival more heavily relied on their loyalty to the provincial leader than on the grassroots support from local residents. By contrast, the political survival of county leaders from the weak faction largely depended on local grassroots support, which they could best secure if they focused on local development. In addition, a guerrilla presence in a county further improved development performance either by intensifying the local accountability of the county leader, or by better facilitating the provision of local public goods beneficial to development. We find consistent and robust evidence supporting these assumptions. Being affiliated with weak factions and having local accountability are both associated with sizable long-term benefits that are evident in terms of a county’s growth and level of private-sector development, its citizens’ education levels, and their survival rates during the Great Chinese Famine. We also find that being affiliated with the strong faction and adopting pro-local policies are associated with higher likelihood of a local leader’s political survival. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25901 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583575 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hanming Fang,Linke Hou,Mingxing Liu,et al. Factions, Local Accountability, and Long-Term Development: Theory and Evidence. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25901.pdf（718KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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