| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25948 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25948 |
| Does Workplace Competition Increase Labor Supply? Evidence from a Field Experiment | |
| Amalia R. Miller; Ragan Petrie; Carmit Segal | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-17 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial incentives worked past the minimum time, but awarding a tournament prize increased work time and effort by over 80% and lowered costs of effort or output by over a third. Effort was similar with alternative (piece rate, low-prize tournament) bonuses. Men worked longer than women in the high-prize tournament, but for the same duration in other treatments. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25948 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583622 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Amalia R. Miller,Ragan Petrie,Carmit Segal. Does Workplace Competition Increase Labor Supply? Evidence from a Field Experiment. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25948.pdf（647KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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