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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25966
来源IDWorking Paper 25966
What's Wrong with Pittsburgh? Delegated Investors and Liquidity Concentration
Andra C. Ghent
发表日期2019-06-17
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要What makes an asset institutional-quality? This paper proposes that one reason is the existing concentration of delegated investors in a market through a liquidity channel. Consistent with this intuition, it documents differences in investor composition across US cities and shows that delegated investors concentrate investments in cities with higher turnover. It then calibrates a search model showing how heterogeneity in liquidity preferences makes some markets more liquid even when assets have identical cash flows. The calibration indicates that commercial real estate commands an illiquidity premium of two percentage points annually relative to a perfectly liquid asset with similar credit risk.
主题Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Real Estate
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25966
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583640
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GB/T 7714
Andra C. Ghent. What's Wrong with Pittsburgh? Delegated Investors and Liquidity Concentration. 2019.
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