| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25985 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25985 |
| The Political Economy of Social Security Reform | |
| Michael J. Boskin; Diego J. Perez; Daniel S. Bennett | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-24 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We identify which types of Social Security reforms are supported when people vote in their financial self-interest, under alternative economic and demographic projections and voting proclivity assumptions. While 40% of voters have negative lifetime net transfers, less than 10% have negative future transfers under the un- sustainable status quo. Framing the problem as a choice between reforms is necessary for any to receive majority support. Delayed reforms are often preferred, but immediate tax hikes or slower benefit growth win in some circumstances. Inter-generational AND intragenerational heterogeneity of economic interests combine to affect which reforms are blocked and which are feasible. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25985 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583659 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael J. Boskin,Diego J. Perez,Daniel S. Bennett. The Political Economy of Social Security Reform. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25985.pdf（403KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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