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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25985
来源IDWorking Paper 25985
The Political Economy of Social Security Reform
Michael J. Boskin; Diego J. Perez; Daniel S. Bennett
发表日期2019-06-24
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We identify which types of Social Security reforms are supported when people vote in their financial self-interest, under alternative economic and demographic projections and voting proclivity assumptions. While 40% of voters have negative lifetime net transfers, less than 10% have negative future transfers under the un- sustainable status quo. Framing the problem as a choice between reforms is necessary for any to receive majority support. Delayed reforms are often preferred, but immediate tax hikes or slower benefit growth win in some circumstances. Inter-generational AND intragenerational heterogeneity of economic interests combine to affect which reforms are blocked and which are feasible.
主题Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25985
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583659
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michael J. Boskin,Diego J. Perez,Daniel S. Bennett. The Political Economy of Social Security Reform. 2019.
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