| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25988 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25988 |
| Endogenous Social Connections in Legislatures | |
| Marco Battaglini; Eleonora Patacchini; Edoardo Rainone | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-24 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model of the U.S. Congress in which social connections among Congress members are endogenous and matter for their legislative activity. We propose a novel equilibrium concept for the network formation game that allows for a sharp characterization of equilibrium behavior and that yields a unique prediction under testable conditions. While the equilibrium is characterized by a large number of nonlinear equations, we show that the model can be structurally estimated by an appropriately designed Approximate Bayesian Computation method. Estimating the model using data from the 109th to 113th U.S. Congresses, we show that social connections are important for legislators' productivities and we identify some of the key determinants of social centralities in Congress. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25988 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583662 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Battaglini,Eleonora Patacchini,Edoardo Rainone. Endogenous Social Connections in Legislatures. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25988.pdf（1509KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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