| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26001 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26001 |
| The Failure of Free Entry | |
| Germán Gutiérrez; Thomas Philippon | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-24 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the entry and exit of firms across U.S. industries over the past 40 years. The elasticity of entry with respect to Tobin’s Q was positive and significant until the late 1990s but declined to zero afterwards. Standard macroeconomic models suggest two potential explanations: rising entry costs or rising returns to scale. We find that neither returns to scale nor technological costs can explain the decline in the Q- elasticity of entry, but lobbying and regulations can. We reconcile conflicting results in the literature and show that regulations drive down the entry and growth of small firms relative to large ones, particularly in industries with high lobbying expenditures. We conclude that lobbying and regulations have caused free entry to fail. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26001 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583675 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Germán Gutiérrez,Thomas Philippon. The Failure of Free Entry. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26001.pdf（457KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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