| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26004 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26004 |
| CEO-Board Dynamics | |
| John R. Graham; Hyunseob Kim; Mark T. Leary | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller for example than the strong persistence in board structure that we document. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies document a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched. |
| 主题 | Other ; History of Economic Thought ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26004 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583678 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John R. Graham,Hyunseob Kim,Mark T. Leary. CEO-Board Dynamics. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26004.pdf（382KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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