| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26083 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26083 |
| Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Steven Shavell | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-22 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment—notably, on whether to grant parole. We study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state’s objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise a criminal’s initial sentence on the basis of deterrence-relevant information obtained during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on avoiding recidivism. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26083 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583757 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Steven Shavell. Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26083.pdf（297KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
