全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w26113
来源ID	Working Paper 26113
	Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance
	Arpit Gupta; Kunal Sachdeva
发表日期	2019-07-29
出版年	2019
语种	英语
摘要	Hedge fund managers contribute substantial personal capital, or "skin in the game," into their funds. While these allocations may better align incentives, managers may also strategically allocate their private capital in ways that negatively affect investors. We find that funds with more inside investment outperform other funds within the same family. However, this relationship is driven by managerial decisions to invest capital in their least-scalable strategies and restrict the entry of new outsider capital into these funds. Our results suggest that skin in the game may work as a rent-extraction mechanism at the expense of fund participation of outside investors.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Relations
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w26113
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583785
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Arpit Gupta,Kunal Sachdeva. Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance. 2019.