| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26115 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26115 |
| Venture Capital Contracts | |
| Michael Ewens; Alexander S. Gorbenko; Arthur Korteweg | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-29 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate the impact of venture capital (VC) contract terms on startup outcomes and the split of value between the entrepreneur and investor, accounting for endogenous selection via a novel dynamic search and matching model. The estimation uses a new, large data set of first financing rounds of startup companies. Consistent with efficient contracting theories, there is an optimal equity split between agents, which maximizes the probability of success. However, VCs use their bargaining power to receive more investor-friendly terms compared to the contract that maximizes startup values. Better VCs still benefit the startup and the entrepreneur, due to their positive value creation. Counterfactuals show that reducing search frictions shifts the bargaining power to VCs and benefits them at the expense of entrepreneurs. The results show that selection of agents into deals is a first-order factor to take into account in studies of contracting. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26115 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583787 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ewens,Alexander S. Gorbenko,Arthur Korteweg. Venture Capital Contracts. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26115.pdf（740KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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