| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26141 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26141 |
| Sharing a Government | |
| Jaume Ventura | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-12 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a simple theoretical framework to study a set of regions, each with its own regional government, who share a union or central government. These governments must decide whether to implement or discard a large number of projects that produce local benefits for the region that implements them, and externalities for the rest of the regions. Conflict or disagreement arises since different regions value projects differently. The classic assignment problem consists of deciding who decides these projects, either the union or the regional governments. It is well known that regional governments are insensitive to externalities. The key observation here is that the union government is insensitive to local benefits. Thus, each government maximizes only a piece of the value of projects, and disregards the other one. This observations leads to simple and clear rules for solving the assignment problem. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; Trade ; Globalization and International Relations ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26141 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583815 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jaume Ventura. Sharing a Government. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26141.pdf（830KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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