| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26155 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26155 |
| Deadlock on the Board | |
| Jason Roderick Donaldson; Nadya Malenko; Giorgia Piacentino | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-19 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a dynamic model of board decision-making. We show that a board could retain a policy all directors agree is worse than an available alternative. Thus, directors may retain a CEO they agree is bad—a deadlocked board leads to an entrenched CEO. We explore how to compose boards and appoint directors to mitigate deadlock. We find that board diversity and long director tenure can exacerbate deadlock. Moreover, we rationalize why CEOs and incumbent directors have power to appoint new directors: to avoid deadlock. Our model speaks to short-termism, staggered boards, and proxy access. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26155 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583829 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jason Roderick Donaldson,Nadya Malenko,Giorgia Piacentino. Deadlock on the Board. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26155.pdf（400KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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