| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26160 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26160 |
| An Experiment in Candidate Selection | |
| Katherine Casey; Abou Bakarr Kamara; Niccoló Meriggi | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-19 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits—like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination—at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters’ most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26160 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583834 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Katherine Casey,Abou Bakarr Kamara,Niccoló Meriggi. An Experiment in Candidate Selection. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26160.pdf（1225KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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