Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w26161 |
来源ID | Working Paper 26161 |
Who Chooses Commitment? Evidence and Welfare Implications | |
Mariana Carrera; Heather Royer; Mark Stehr; Justin Sydnor; Dmitry Taubinsky | |
发表日期 | 2019-08-19 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper investigates whether offers of commitment contracts, in the form of self-imposed choice-set restrictions and penalties with no financial upside, are well-targeted tools for addressing self-control problems. In an experiment on gym attendance (N= 1;248), we examine take-up of commitment contracts, and also introduce a separate elicitation task to identify actual and perceived time inconsistency. There is high take-up of commitment contracts for greater gym attendance, resulting in significant increases in exercise. However, this is take-up is influenced both by noisy valuation and incorrect beliefs about one’s time inconsistency. Approximately half of the people who take up commitment contracts for higher gym attendance also take up commitment contracts for lower gym attendance. There is little association between commitment contract take-up and reduced-form and structural estimates of actual or perceived time inconsistency. A novel information treatment providing an exogenous shock to awareness of time inconsistency reduces demand for commitment contracts. Structural estimates of a model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and gym attendance imply that offering our commitment contracts lowers consumer surplus, and is less socially efficient than utilizing linear exercise subsidies that achieve the same average change in behavior. |
主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26161 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583835 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mariana Carrera,Heather Royer,Mark Stehr,et al. Who Chooses Commitment? Evidence and Welfare Implications. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w26161.pdf(1423KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。