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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w26203
来源IDWorking Paper 26203
Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia
Gaurav Khanna; Carlos Medina; Anant Nyshadham; Jorge A. Tamayo
发表日期2019-09-02
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellín over a decade. We exploit exogenous variation in formal-sector employment around a socioeconomic-score cutoff, below which individuals receive benefits if not formally employed, to test whether a higher cost to formal-sector employment induces crime. Regression discontinuity estimates show this policy generated reductions in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in organized crime, but no effects on crimes of impulse or opportunity.
主题Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w26203
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583874
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Gaurav Khanna,Carlos Medina,Anant Nyshadham,et al. Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia. 2019.
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