| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26203 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26203 |
| Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia | |
| Gaurav Khanna; Carlos Medina; Anant Nyshadham; Jorge A. Tamayo | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-02 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellín over a decade. We exploit exogenous variation in formal-sector employment around a socioeconomic-score cutoff, below which individuals receive benefits if not formally employed, to test whether a higher cost to formal-sector employment induces crime. Regression discontinuity estimates show this policy generated reductions in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in organized crime, but no effects on crimes of impulse or opportunity. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26203 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583874 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gaurav Khanna,Carlos Medina,Anant Nyshadham,et al. Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26203.pdf（736KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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