G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w26207
来源IDWorking Paper 26207
Taxation and the Superrich
Florian Scheuer; Joel Slemrod
发表日期2019-09-02
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要This paper addresses the modern optimal tax progressivity literature, which clarifies the key role of the behavioral response to taxation and accounts for the incomes of the superrich being qualitatively different than others. Some may be “superstars,” for whom small differences in talent are magnified into much larger earnings differences, while others may work in winner-take-all markets, such that their effort to climb the ladder of success reduces the returns to others. We stress that pivotal tax-rate elasticities are not structural parameters, and will be smaller the broader and less plastic is the tax base and the more effective is the enforcement of tax evasion. For this reason, normative analysis of tax rates should be accompanied by attention to the tax base, with special attention to capital gains, which comprise a large fraction of the taxable income of the superrich.
主题Public Economics ; Taxation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w26207
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583878
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Florian Scheuer,Joel Slemrod. Taxation and the Superrich. 2019.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w26207.pdf(391KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Florian Scheuer]的文章
[Joel Slemrod]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Florian Scheuer]的文章
[Joel Slemrod]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Florian Scheuer]的文章
[Joel Slemrod]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w26207.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。