| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26171 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26171 |
| Dancing With Activists | |
| Lucian A. Bebchuk; Alon Brav; Wei Jiang; Thomas Keusch | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-09 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An important milestone often reached in the life of an activist engagement is entering into a “settlement” agreement between the activist and the target’s board. Using a comprehensive hand-collected data set, we analyze the drivers, nature, and consequences of such settlement agreements. Settlements are more likely when the activist has a credible threat to win board seats in a proxy fight and when incumbents’ reputation concerns are stronger. Consistent with incomplete contracting, face-saving benefits and private information considerations, settlements commonly do not contract directly on operational or leadership changes sought by the activist but rather on board composition changes. Settlements are accompanied by positive stock price reactions, and they are subsequently followed by changes of the type sought by activists, including CEO turnover, higher shareholder payouts, and improved operating performance. We find no evidence to support concerns that settlements enable activists to extract rents at the expense of other investors. Our analysis provides a look into the “black box” of activist engagements and contributes to understanding how activism brings about changes in target companies. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26171 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583888 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian A. Bebchuk,Alon Brav,Wei Jiang,et al. Dancing With Activists. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26171.pdf（800KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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