| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26287 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26287 |
| Empirical Models of Lobbying | |
| Matilde Bombardini; Francesco Trebbi | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within Political Economy. In surveying extant evidence, we emphasize quid-pro-quo and informational issues in special interest politics and we highlight crucial open research questions in both. The main unresolved methodological issues remain how to properly account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced, and on how distorted those equilibrium policies might be relative to the interests of the general public. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the welfare distortions of lobbying remains one of the most elusive |
| 主题 | Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26287 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583961 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matilde Bombardini,Francesco Trebbi. Empirical Models of Lobbying. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26287.pdf（593KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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