| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26307 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26307 |
| Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk | |
| Javier Bianchi; Pablo Ottonello; Ignacio Presno | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What is the optimal fiscal policy response to a recession when the government is subject to sovereign risk? We study this question in a model of endogenous sovereign default with nominal rigidities. Increasing spending in a recession reduces unemployment, but exposes the government to a debt crisis. We quantitatively analyze this trade-off between stimulus and austerity and find that expanding government spending may be undesirable even in the presence of sizeable Keynesian stabilization gains and inequality concerns. Consistent with these findings, we show that sovereign risk is a key driver of the observed fiscal procyclicality in the data. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26307 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583979 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Javier Bianchi,Pablo Ottonello,Ignacio Presno. Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26307.pdf（1819KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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