| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26319 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26319 |
| The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers | |
| Costas Cavounidis; Kevin Lang; Russell Weinstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-30 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | African Americans face shorter employment durations than apparently similar whites. We hypothesize that employers discriminate in either acquiring or acting on ability-relevant information. We construct a model in which firms may "monitor" workers. Monitoring black but not white workers is self-sustaining: new black hires are more likely to have been screened by a previous employer, causing firms to discriminate in monitoring. We confirm the model's prediction that the unemployment hazard is initially higher for blacks but converges to that for whites. Two additional predictions, lower lifetime incomes and longer unemployment durations for blacks, are known to be strongly empirically supported. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Discrimination |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26319 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583991 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Costas Cavounidis,Kevin Lang,Russell Weinstein. The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26319.pdf（882KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
