| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26367 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26367 |
| Subsidy Targeting with Market Power | |
| Maria Polyakova; Stephen P. Ryan | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-14 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Public programs frequently use observable characteristics of recipients, such as income, to target benefits. We show theoretically that when the provision of the subsidized good is decentralized to intermediaries with market power, targeting of subsidies induces a “demographic externality” that can distort the incidence and efficiency of public transfers. We examine this possibility empirically in the context of means-tested subsidies for privately-provided health insurance under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). We estimate that the overall incidence of premium subsidies on consumers in ACA Marketplaces is less than 50 percent, and a third of net government spending on premium subsidies is a deadweight loss. Market power in the presence of means-tested subsidies leads to regressive redistribution, lowering consumer surplus and rates of insurance in the poorer population targeted by subsidies. Under sufficiently high social preferences for redistribution, however, means-tested subsidies still dominate income-invariant transfers. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Public Goods ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Poverty and Wellbeing ; Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26367 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584041 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maria Polyakova,Stephen P. Ryan. Subsidy Targeting with Market Power. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26367.pdf（1493KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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