| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26382 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26382 |
| Playing Hide and Seek: How Lenders Respond to Borrower Protection | |
| Youssef Benzarti | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-21 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper uses the universe of mortgage contracts to estimate the response of high-interest lenders to borrower protection regulations aimed at simplifying and making loan terms more transparent. Using a quasi-experimental design, we find that lenders substantially reduce interest rates – by an average of 10% – in order to avoid being subject to borrower protection, without reducing amounts lent or the number of loans approved. This finding implies that a substantial number of high-interest lenders prefer to issue obfuscatory mortgage contracts with lower interest rates rather than more transparent and regulated mortgages with higher interest rates. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26382 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584056 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Youssef Benzarti. Playing Hide and Seek: How Lenders Respond to Borrower Protection. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26382.pdf（367KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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