| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26394 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26394 |
| Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms | |
| Bnaya Dreyfuss; Ori Heffetz; Matthew Rabin | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-21 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Deferred Acceptance (DA), a widely implemented algorithm, is meant to improve allocations: under classical preferences, it induces preference-concordant rankings. However, recent evidence shows that—in both real, large-stakes applications and experiments—participants frequently play seemingly dominated, significantly costly, strategies that avoid small chances of good outcomes. We show theoretically why, with expectations-based loss aversion, this behavior may be partly intentional. Reanalyzing existing experimental data on random serial dictatorship (a restriction of DA), we show that such reference-dependent preferences, with a degree and distribution of loss aversion that explain common levels of risk aversion elsewhere, fit the data better than no-loss-aversion preferences. |
| 主题 | Other ; History of Economic Thought ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26394 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584068 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bnaya Dreyfuss,Ori Heffetz,Matthew Rabin. Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26394.pdf（4975KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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