| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26400 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26400 |
| Lending to the Unbanked: Relational Contracting with Loan Sharks | |
| Kevin Lang; Kaiwen Leong; Huailu Li; Haibo Xu | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-28 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study roughly 11,000 loans from unlicensed moneylenders to over 1,000 borrowers in Singapore and provide basic information about this understudied market. Borrowers frequently expect to repay late. While lenders do rely on additional punishments to enforce loans, the primary cost of not repaying on time is compounding of a very high interest rate. We develop a very simple model of the relational contract between loan sharks and borrowers and use it to predict the effect of a crackdown on illegal moneylending. Consistent with our model, the crackdown raised the interest rate and lowered the size of loans. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Poverty and Wellbeing ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26400 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584074 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kevin Lang,Kaiwen Leong,Huailu Li,et al. Lending to the Unbanked: Relational Contracting with Loan Sharks. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26400.pdf（418KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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