| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26404 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26404 |
| Rules and Commitment in Communication: an Experimental Analysis | |
| Guillaume R. Fréchette; Alessandro Lizzeri; Jacopo Perego | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-28 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the role of commitment in communication and its interactions with rules, which determine whether information is verifiable. Our framework nests models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persuasion. It predicts that commitment has opposite effects on information transmission under the two alternative rules. We leverage these contrasting forces to experimentally establish that subjects react to commitment in line with the main qualitative implications of the theory. Quantitatively, not all subjects behave as predicted. We show that a form of commitment blindness leads some senders to overcommunicate when information is verifiable and undercommunicate when it is not. This generates an unpredicted gap in information transmission across the two rules, suggesting a novel role for verifiable information in practice. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26404 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584078 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guillaume R. Fréchette,Alessandro Lizzeri,Jacopo Perego. Rules and Commitment in Communication: an Experimental Analysis. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26404.pdf（940KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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