| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26409 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26409 |
| Electoral Competition with Fake News | |
| Gene M. Grossman; Elhanan Helpman | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-28 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Misinformation pervades political competition. We introduce opportunities for political candidates and their media supporters to spread fake news about the policy environment and perhaps about parties' positions into a familiar model of electoral competition. In the baseline model with full information, the parties' positions converge to those that maximize aggregate welfare. When parties can broadcast fake news to audiences that disproportionately include their partisans, policy divergence and suboptimal outcomes can result. We study a sequence of models that impose progressively tighter constraints on false reporting and characterize situations that lead to divergence and a polarized electorate. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26409 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584083 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gene M. Grossman,Elhanan Helpman. Electoral Competition with Fake News. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26409.pdf（351KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
