| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26451 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26451 |
| Rules without Commitment: Reputation and Incentives | |
| Alessandro Dovis; Rishabh Kirpalani | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-11-11 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the optimal design of rules in a dynamic model when there is a time inconsistency problem and uncertainty about whether the policy maker can commit to follow the rule ex post. The policy maker can either be a commitment type, which can always commit to follow rules, or an optimizing type, which sequentially decides whether to follow rules or not. This type is unobservable to private agents, who learn about it through the actions of the policy maker. Higher beliefs that the policy maker is the commitment type (the policy maker's reputation) help promote good behavior by private agents. We show that in a large class of economies, preserving uncertainty about the policy maker's type is preferable from an ex-ante perspective. If the initial reputation is not too high, the optimal rule is the strictest one that is incentive compatible for the optimizing type. We show that reputational considerations imply that the optimal rule is more lenient than the one that would arise in a static environment. Moreover, opaque rules are preferable to transparent ones if reputation is high enough. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26451 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584122 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Dovis,Rishabh Kirpalani. Rules without Commitment: Reputation and Incentives. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26451.pdf（509KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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