| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26469 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26469 |
| Endogenous Leverage and Default in the Laboratory | |
| Marco Cipriani; Ana Fostel; Daniel Houser | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-11-18 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study default and endogenous leverage in the laboratory. To this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model of collateralized borrowing amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. In the model, leverage is endogenous: agents choose how much to borrow using a risky asset as collateral, and there are no ad-hoc collateral constraints. When the risky asset is financial, namely, its payoff does not depend on ownership (such as a bonds), collateral requirements are high and there is no default. In contrast, when the risky asset is non-financial, namely, its payoff depends on ownership (such as a firm), collateral requirements are lower and default occurs. The experimental outcomes are in line with the theory's main predictions. The type of collateral, whether financial or not, matters. Default rates and loss from default are higher when the risky asset is non-financial, stemming from laxer collateral requirements. Default rates and collateral requirements are closer to the theoretical predictions as the experiment progresses. |
| 主题 | Other ; General, Teaching ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26469 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584140 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Cipriani,Ana Fostel,Daniel Houser. Endogenous Leverage and Default in the Laboratory. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26469.pdf（1219KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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