| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26519 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26519 |
| Labor in the Boardroom | |
| Simon Jäger; Benjamin Schoefer; Jörg Heining | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-02 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate the wage effects of shared governance, or codetermination, in the form of a mandate of one third of corporate board seats going to worker representatives. We study a reformin Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for stock corporations incorporated after August 1994, while it locked the mandate for the slightly older cohorts. Our research design compares firm cohorts incorporated before the reform and after; in a robustness check we additionally draw on the analogous difference in unaffected firm types (LLCs). We find no effects of board-level codetermination on wages and the wage structure, even in firms with particularly flexible wages. The degree of rent sharing and the labor share are also unaffected. We reject that disinvestment could have offset wage effects through the canonical hold-up channel, as shared governance, if anything, increases capital formation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Relations ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26519 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584191 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Jäger,Benjamin Schoefer,Jörg Heining. Labor in the Boardroom. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26519.pdf（1224KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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