全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w26543
来源ID	Working Paper 26543
	Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy
	Lucian A. Bebchuk; Scott Hirst
发表日期	2019-12-16
出版年	2019
语种	英语
摘要	We seek to contribute to understanding index fund stewardship by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of such stewardship. We put forward an agency-cost theory of the stewardship decisions that index fund managers make. Our agency-costs analysis shows that index fund managers have strong incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and positions of corporate managers. We also undertake an empirical analysis of the full range of stewardship activities that index funds do and do not undertake. We show that the body of evidence is, on the whole, consistent with the incentive issues identified by our agency-costs framework. Finally, we explain how our analysis should reorient important ongoing debates regarding common ownership and hedge fund activism.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w26543
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584217
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lucian A. Bebchuk,Scott Hirst. Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 2019.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w26543.pdf（1017KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览