| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26550 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26550 |
| Moral Hazard, Wildfires, and the Economic Incidence of Natural Disasters | |
| Patrick Baylis; Judson Boomhower | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-16 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This study measures the degree to which large public expenditures on wildfire protection subsidize development in harm's way. Using administrative firefighting data, we calculate geographically-differentiated implicit subsidies to homeowners throughout the western USA. We first examine how the presence of homes affects firefighting expenditures. These results are used to reconstruct the implied historical cost of protecting each home and to perform an actuarial calculation of expected future protection cost. The expected net present value of this subsidy can exceed 20% of a home's value. It increases with fire risk and decreases surprisingly steeply with development density. A simple model is used to explore effects on expansion of developed areas, density, and private risk-reducing investments. These results demonstrate how policy and institutions influence the costs imposed by a changing climate. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26550 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584224 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Baylis,Judson Boomhower. Moral Hazard, Wildfires, and the Economic Incidence of Natural Disasters. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26550.pdf（5353KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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