| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26561 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26561 |
| Financial Risk Capacity | |
| Saki Bigio; Adrien d'; Avernas | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-16 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Financial crises are particularly severe and lengthy when banks fail to recapitalize after bearing large losses. We present a model that explains the slow recovery of bank capital and economic activity. Banks provide intermediation in markets with information asymmetries. Large equity losses force banks to tighten intermediation, which exacerbates adverse selection. Adverse selection lowers bank profit margins which slows both the internal growth of equity and equity injections. This mechanism generates financial crises characterized by persistent low growth. The lack of equity injections during crises is a coordination failure that is solved when the decision to recapitalize banks is centralized. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26561 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584235 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Saki Bigio,Adrien d',Avernas. Financial Risk Capacity. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26561.pdf（738KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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