全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w26654
来源ID	Working Paper 26654
	Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives
	Antoine Camous; Russell Cooper
发表日期	2020-01-13
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies the determination of income taxes in a dynamic setting with human capital accumulation. The goal is to understand the factors that support an outcome without complete redistribution, given a majority of relatively poor agents. In the analysis, the internal dynamics of income are not sufficient to prevent complete redistribution under majority rule without commitment. However, a political influence game limits the support for expropriatory taxation and preserves incentives. In some cases, the outcome of the game corresponds with the optimal allocation under commitment.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Taxation
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w26654
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584327
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Antoine Camous,Russell Cooper. Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives. 2020.