| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26656 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26656 |
| Equilibrium Consequences of Corruption on Firms: Evidence from China\u2019s Anti-Corruption Campaign | |
| Haoyuan Ding; Hanming Fang; Shu Lin; Kang Shi | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-13 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use China's recent anti-corruption campaign as a natural experiment to examine the (market expected) equilibrium consequences of (anti-)corruption. We argue that the announcement of inspections of provincial governments by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on May 17, 2013 represents a significant departure of past norms of anti-corruption campaigns, and thus serves a rare empirical opportunity to examine the equilibrium effects of anti-corruption campaigns for firms. We first present a conceptual framework to illustrate the channels through which anti-corruption actions can influence firms. Using an event study approach and May 17, 2013 as the event date, we find that, overall, the stock market responded positively to the announcement of strong anti-corruption actions. The announcement returns are significantly lower for luxury-goods producers, and SOES, large firms, or politically connected firms earn lower returns than private, small, or non-connected firms. We also find that existing local institutions play a crucial role in determining the announcement returns across firms. Moreover, a long-term difference-in-differences analysis shows that higher returns during the event window are associated with more subsequent entries of new firms and faster expansions of existing firms. Finally, we also provide direct evidence consistent with the endogenous grits effect. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26656 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584329 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Haoyuan Ding,Hanming Fang,Shu Lin,et al. Equilibrium Consequences of Corruption on Firms: Evidence from China\u2019s Anti-Corruption Campaign. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26656.pdf（698KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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